Political Economy
Informative Campaign Promises (submitted)
Voter Campaign Contributions The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (Contributions): vol. 11, iss. 1.
Confirmatory News (submitted)
The Coherence of Political Action: A Case Against Independence
This paper shows that public ownership is in some circumstances a constrained
optimum. The reason is that politicians have control rights in the first place.
Giving them further control may actually increase social welfare by introducing
some coherence in their policy choices. We show, furthermore, that when the
ownership structure is chosen by politicians, public control can be rationalized
by their political signaling benefits.
Key words: public ownership structure, political agency JEL codes: D82,
H11, H52, L33.
Insider Privatization and Careers - Case Study of a Russian Firm in Transition, "The Analysis of Firms and Employees," Stefan Bender, Julia Lane, Kathryn Shaw, Fredrik Andersson, and Till von Wachter(eds.), NBER, University of Chicago Press.